1 The process by which economists turned the utility concept into a one-dimensional determinate ordering is described in T.W. Warke, 'Mathematical Fitness in the Evolution of the Utility Concept from Bentham to Jevons to Marshall', Journal of the History of Economic Thought, xxii. (2000) , pp. 3-23. 2 See G.E. Moore, Principa Ethica, Cambridge, 1903 . A more detailed presentation of my case against Moore is given in 'Multi-Dimensional Utility and the Index Number Problem: Jeremy Bentham, J. S. Mill and Qualitative Hedonism,' Utilitas, xii. (2000) , pp. 176-203 3 R.M. Hare, 'Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism' in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. A. Sen and B. Williams, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 23-38 ; J.C. Harsanyi in ibid., pp. 39-63; A. Quinton, Utilitarian Ethics, 2 nd edition, London, 1989; R.E. Goodin, 'Utility and the Good' in A Companion to Ethics, ed. P. Singer, Oxford, 1993, pp. 241-48; and G. Scarre, Utilitarianism, London, 1996. 4 M. Warnock, Ethics since 1900, 2 nd edition, London, 1966. 5 F.R. Berger, Happiness, Justice and Freedom, Berkeley, 1984. 6 Quinton, Utilitarian Ethics, p. 45. would be justified were it accurate, but in fact it is abundantly clear throughout his writings that Bentham regarded happiness, or utility, as a vector of pleasures (and freedoms from pain). A vector maps to a sum only if its elements are equally weighted, and Bentham's method for estimating the value of a pleasure or pain for an individual agent shows that he imposed no such condition. In particular, Bentham distinguished between what I shall term the dose of a potential pleasure or pain -its duration discounted for remoteness and uncertainty -and the intensity with which a person responds to that specific stimulus. For Bentham, the happiness associated with a given act was determined jointly by the act's pleasure/pain doses and by the intensity weights of all interested agents. I would further argue that Mill was showing the same perspective, with 'quantity' referring to dose and 'quality' referring to intensity of response, when he stated in Utilitarianism: 'It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone '. 7 For Bentham and Mill, the variability of intensity weights, both across different types of pleasure and pain for any given agent and across different agents for any given type of pleasure or pain, meant that neither individual nor aggregate happiness could be expressed as a simple sum of pleasures. Furthermore, Bentham recognized that an inherent imprecision of intensity weights carries over into imprecise happiness comparisons among alternative choices. A net pleasure advantage between some pairs of acts will be obvious to an agent, but for other pairs the optimal choice will be problematic even if their pleasure/pain doses are fully known. Though he could have known neither the term nor its formal properties, Bentham treated the utility associated with 'complex exciting causes' (that is, any compound mixture of pleasures and pains) as an index number.
In order to illustrate Bentham's method we must begin, as he did, with the measure of a single pleasure or pain to a single agent:
To a person considered by himself, the value of a pleasure or pain considered by itself, will be greater or less, according to the four following circumstances: 7 J.S. Mill, 'Utilitarianism' in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. J.M. Robson, Toronto, 1969, 1. Its intensity.
Its duration.
3. Its certainty or uncertainty.
Its propinquity or remoteness.
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Bentham's most detailed instructions for consolidating these circumstances appeared in the Codification Proposal (1822), where he singled out intensity as 'not susceptible of precise expression' while claiming that the 'others are'.
9 To illustrate Bentham's method, let us consider as our complex exciting cause a proposed visit by two friends, Geri and Ben, to an exhibit of Robert Mapplethorpe photographs.
Bentham's first step in evaluating an act calls for a listing of every potential pleasure or pain associated with it. These are, we may suppose, pleasures of the eye and of amity; and possible pain of impiety (I refer, of course, to some of the subject matter of Mapplethorpe's work and its condemnation by certain religious authorities).
Bentham presumed in the Codification Proposal that the duration of each pleasure and pain could be specified, together with a probability that the anticipated sensation will in fact be realized, thus yielding the duration's expected value. 10 In addition, he applied an across-the-board discount factor for the remoteness in time of the proposed event, for which he used the prevailing money rate of interest on the grounds that it measures a generalized pain of postponement. 10 Neither Bentham nor Mill paid much heed to the distinction between utility, a property of an object as perceived by an agent, and happiness, a property of the effect that the object has on the agent (see J. Broome, 'Utility', Economics and Philosophy, vii. (1991) pp. 1-12). Bentham's procedure relates validly the amount of potential hedonic pleasure from a choice under consideration to the amount of realized hedonic pleasure once the choice is taken only if expectations are accurately represented by an objective probability distribution that is known to the agent. In economists' terms, Bentham's hedonic calculus applied to future consequences of alternative choices carries an implicit assumption that agents have rational expectations. 11 Legislator of the World (CW), p. 251. Bentham's use of an external discount rate to reflect the pain of postponement is required in order that doses be independent of agents. It would seem more realistic to presume that agents apply their own discount rates, and that these differ between types of pleasure and pain, but perhaps Bentham's procedure is justified by the usefulness of the distinction between objective dose and subjective intensity that he wanted to achieve. determine that the right joint decision for Geri and Ben according to classical utilitarianism is Act A, for it yields 15 net pleasure units as compared to 14 for Act M.
As in any ethical system, however, the right decisions are not always made.
Although Ben enjoys a harmony of interest with the ethically right choice, for Geri there is conflict. Since each of them has an interest in coming to agreement (for each of them, the other's first choice is more desirable than staying home or going alone),
there exists an incentive to negotiate. But the actual outcome will depend upon their respective bargaining skills and strategies rather than the dictates of utilitarian ethics.
Geri's disharmony of interests in my example thus raises the issue of utilitarian duty. summed over all agents within the jurisdiction, using egalitarian interpersonal weighting. In order to secure this outcome, public choice decision-makers must be motivated to apply the utilitarian criterion (rather than indulge their own personal preferences), and they must then be able to estimate accurately what are the mean intensity weights on all relevant pleasures and pains among the constituents they serve.
Glossing over these thorny political problems, my final point in this section is that the right outcome depends once again upon the composition of tastes and preferences among the affected agents. If, for example, everyone is either a 'Geri' or a 'Ben', then it is right for the City Council to sponsor the Adams exhibition if the relevant population consists of 36% or more Bens, but it is right to sponsor instead the Mapplethorpe exhibition if the share of Bens is 35% or less (recalling that the pleasure loss from visiting the less-preferred exhibit is 2.2 for Ben and 1.2 for Geri, the value of x at which 2.2x equals 1.2[1-x] is 0.353).
An Axiomatic Description of Classical Utilitarianism
In this section I intend to present my interpretation of classical utilitarian ethics more concisely, as a set of four axioms, and to consider briefly the consistency with which
Bentham and Mill (of Utilitarianism) adhered to each of them.
The first axiom I would term Euclidian, in the sense that Bentham and Mill took it to be a self-evident proposition, the foundation of their entire system and unsusceptible to proof: Axiom 1. It is better for a sentient being to experience pleasure than pain. Bentham called this, simply, 'the principle of utility' and said of it:
Is it susceptible of any direct proof? it should seem not: for that which is used to prove every thing else, cannot itself be proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. To give such proof is as impossible as it is needless.
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There can be no doubt that both Bentham and Mill accepted this axiom wholeheartedly and consistently throughout their entire works. I have deliberately distinguished between the principle of utility and the proposition that it is only pleasure that has value for human beings, because the latter addendum was never doubted by Bentham whereas Mill labored much harder to convince himself of its validity. The proposition that underlies the uniqueness of hedonic value, according to my interpretation of classical utilitarianism, will therefore be stated separately as axiom three. The second of my ontological axioms is the addendum to the principle of utility that excludes anything other than experienced pleasure or pain as an indicator of value:
Axiom 3. Any attribution of intrinsic worth to any form of human behavior is a human artifact. I use 'intrinsic worth' here in the same sense as did Moore, meaning an attribute, or named aspect, of an act or state of mind that is recognizably 'good' independent of the response of any agent, and which therefore ought to exist for its own sake:
Every one does in fact understand the question "Is this good?" When he thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked "Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?" It has a distinct meaning for him, even though he may not recognize in what respect it is distinct. Whenever he thinks of "intrinsic value", or "intrinsic worth", or says that a thing "ought to exist", he has before his mind the unique object -the unique property of things -which I mean by "good". Moore's intrinsic value was, the reader will recall, a central point of my illustration in Section Two. In that formulation, a dose of beauty or amity or impiety had no intrinsic value, positive or negative; a utilitarian's approval or disapproval of an act
can not 'disclaim the necessity of looking out for an extrinsic ground', for the value of a dose remains latent unless and until it is accorded a non-zero weight in the response vector of at least one sentient being within its sphere of influence.
Compared to Bentham's certainty and consistency on this point, the extent to which Mill accepted my third axiom is more problematic, and worthy of more extensive comment than I can give it here. In 'Multi-Dimensional Utility and the Index Numnber Problem', I argue that he managed, just barely, to avoid its abrogation in Utilitarianism, and I suggest that this flirtation with intrinsic value was motivated mainly by the polemic purposes of his 1861 essay. In the 1830s he almost certainly would have denied the axiom. Furthermore, Mill never showed the scorn that What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard. Mill's most substantive amendment to Bentham's schema was the notion that an agent might undertake an act just because he or she perceived it to be the right thing to do, or might avoid an act just because he or she perceived it to be the wrong thing to do, irrespective of the net pleasure balance expected to be experienced from doing the act. In the 1830s, Mill named this overriding motive 'conscience'. In
Utilitarianism, he incorporated conscience within psychological hedonism by introducing potential pain or pleasure from the idea of performing certain acts, as a supplement to expected pains and pleasures from the performance itself. In particular,
Mill argued that the idea of virtue in one's choices can become a source of pleasure:
Whatever may be the opinion of utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue is made virtue; however they may believe (as they do) that actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue; yet this being granted, and it having been decided, from considerations of this description, what is virtuous, they not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also recognize as a psychological fact the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it. should welcome its existence is its 'constancy of action', the psychological reality that habitual virtue will produce a larger number of acts with positive externalites than will virtue-as-pleasure:
That which is the result of habit affords no presumption of being intrinsically good; and there would be no reason for wishing that the purpose of virtue should become independent of pleasure and pain, were it not that the influence of the pleasurable and painful associations which prompt to virtue is not sufficienlty to be depended on for unerring constancy of action until it has acquired the support of habit. [...] In other words, this state of the will is a means to good, not intrinsically a good; and does not contradict the doctrine that nothing is good to human beings but in so far as it is either itself pleasurable, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain.
Conclusion
There are two main themes of this paper, as I have conceived it. The first is my contention that utilitarian ethics, classical or contemporary, is defined by two axioms:
(i) it is better for a sentient being to experience pleasure than pain; and (ii) any attribution of intrinsic worth to any form of human behavior is a human artifact. The second theme is my contention that the classical utilitarians can not be understood properly unless it is recognized that their utility concept was irreducibly multidimensional, and that it is therefore useful to reconstruct their system with individual happiness as an index number, consisting of pleasure/pain doses weighted by the individual's corresponding set of relative intensity responses. The degree to which the paper supports its themes is, of course, for the reader to judge.
